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By Jack D. Palma, II*
Indian Water Rights: A State
Perspective After Akin1
The issue of Indian water rights has received very thorough and
scholarly attention over the past two decades 2 and it would be pre-
sumptuous to think that one could, at this late date, provide some
heretofore undiscovered legal insight into the issue. A more
realistic and beneficial goal would be to achieve a better under-
standing of the relative positions of the major stakeholders in this
* Assistant Attorney General for the State of Wyoming. B.A. 1968, Al-
legheny College; J.D. 1974, University of Denver.
1. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976) [hereinafter referred to as Akin].
2. See generally NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLCIES FOR THE
FUTURE 473-483 (1973); F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WA-
TER LAW (National Water Commission 1971); WESTERN STATES WATER
COUNCIL, REPORT ON INDIAN WATER RIGHT CASES IN THE ELEVEN WEST-
ERN STATES (1976) (on file at the Western State Water Council, Salt
Lake City, Utah); Bloom, Indian "Paramount" Rights to Water Use,
16 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST. 669 (1971); Carver, The Implied
Reservation Doctrine: Policy or Law, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 117
(1970); Clyde, Indian Water Rights, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
377 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Clyde, Special Considerations Involving In-
dian Rights, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 237 (1975); Corker, Federal-State
Relations in Water Rights Adjudication and Administration, 17
ROCKY MTN. MmERAL L. INST. 579 (1971); Dellwo, Indian Water
Rights-The Winters Doctrine Updated, 6 GoNz. L. REV. 215 (1971);
Leaphart, Sale and Lease of Indian Water Rights, 33 MONT. L. REV.
266 (1972); Moses, The Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine-From
1866 through Eagle County, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 221 (1975);
Ranquist, The Effect of Changes in Place and Nature of Use of Indian
Rights to Water Reserved Under the "Winters Doctrine," 5 NAT. RE-
SOURCES LAW. 34 (1972); Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights
to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INsT. 631 (1971);
Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights Versus State Rights, 51
N.D. L. REV. 107 (1974); Veeder, Winters Doctrine Rights-Keystone
of National Programs for Western Land and Water Conservation and
Utilization, 26 MONT. L. REV. 149 (1965); Note, A Proposal for theQuantification of Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 CoLum. L. REV.
1299 (1974); Comment, Application of the Winters Doctrine: Quantifi-
cation of the Madison Formation, 21 S.D. L. REV. 144 (1976); Note,
Federally Reserved Rights to Underground Water-A Rising Question
in the Arid West, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 43 (1973).
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controversy. It is with that objective in mind that the state per-
spective is presented.3
I. WESTERN WATER LAW
In order fully to appreciate the state perspective with respect
to the question of Indian water rights, it is essential to understand
the fundamental elements of the prior appropriation system. 4
Under the appropriation system, the water supply has the attributes
of a public as well as a private resource. While the water flowing
within state borders is deemed to be the property of the state,5 pri-
vate rights can be acquired by the actual beneficial use of a measur-
able and, usually, a diverted quantity. The appropriation right
is not dependent upon land ownership and is forfeited by nonuse-
the supply reverting to the public or senior appropriators.6
The prior appropriation doctrine is said to have evolved during
the gold rush days in the west when placer miners first employed
a priority system for determining the ownership of mining claims.7
Under the system, the first to locate a mining claim and use the
water incident to working that claim gained a prior right which
would be protected against the later claims of others. Hence, the
well-worn phrase "first in time is first in right" has been said to
express the essence of the appropriation system.
The federal government first gave formal recognition to the
appropriation system through the passage of the Mining Act of
1866.8 Under that Act the federal government acknowledged the
local customs and laws governing the possession and right to use
water which had arisen on the federal public lands and confirmed
water rights granted thereunder. 9 In 1870, Congress clarified the
Mining Act of 1866 with an amendment 0 which provided that
3. The views presented herein do not necessarily represent the views
of the State of Wyoming.
4. That doctrine, or a hybrid thereof, has been adopted by the 17 "West-
ern" states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
5. See, e.g., Wyo. CoNsT. art. 8, § 1.
6. Two classic cases on the development of western water law are Coffin
v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882), and Lux v. Haggin, 69
Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886). See also 1 S. WEIL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTEm STATES 118-84 (3d ed. 1911).
7. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
8. Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251.
9. Id.
10. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (amending Mining Act of
1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251).
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"all patents granted, or pre-emption or homestead allowed, shall
be subject to any vested and accrued water rights, or rights to
ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such water rights,
as may have been acquired under or recognized by the [Act of
1866] ."11
Seven years later, Congress passed the Desert Land Act of
1877,12 which further strengthened the belief of the Western states
that the appropriation system controlled the apportionment of
waters within their respective borders. 13 That act provided that
water rights on tracts of desert land should
depend upon bona fide prior appropriation: . . . and all surplus
water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together
with the water of all, lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply
upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held
free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, min-
ing and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights.14
Based upon the early acquiescence of the federal government
in the authority of the Western states to control the use of water
within their respective borders, each of the Western states developed
elaborate systems for determining the nature and extent of appro-
priation rights as well as administering the manner of their use.15
In addition, it is not uncommon to find expressions of state owner-
ship of all the waters flowing within state boundaries in the respec-
tive constitutions of the Western states 6 as well as constitutional
declarations sanctioning the appropriation doctrine. 17
Using the appropriation system, homesteaders and pioneers seek-
ing to settle the West appropriated the waters within the states
and territories for irrigation and other purposes. Many of those
appropriations have been consistently applied to beneficial uses
since the late 1800's, and it is not unusual to find streams within
the Western states which were fully appropriated prior to the turn
11. Id.
12. Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377.
13. The false sense of security was heightened by the United States Su-
preme Court decision in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Port-
land Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 160-63 (1935). Portland Cement had
been thought to interpret the Desert Land Act as leaving to the West-
ern states the authority to determine how rights to water would be
acquired within their boundaries.
14. Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377.
15. For a fairly recent and concise synopsis of these laws, see A SuM-
MARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS (R. Dewsnup & D. Jensen eds.,
National Water Commission 1973).
16. WYO. CoNsT. art. 8, § 1.
17. E.g., id. § 3; NEB. CONsT. art. XV, § 6.
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of the century. In view of the apparent early acquiescence of the
federal government in the use of the appropriation doctrine and
the long history of its application throughout the West, it should
not be surprising to find that the states have expressed apprehen-
sion over the reserved rights doctrine, which creates a classification
of water rights existing wholly independent of and inconsistent
with state water law.
II. THE WINTERS DOCTRINE-ITS ORIGIN
The legal principles governing Indian water rights have been
derived almost exclusively from judicial interpretation, beginning
with the United States Supreme Court decision in the case of
Winters v. United States.18 In Winters, the United States brought
an action in the federal district court in Montana on behalf of
the Indian tribes on the Fort Belknap indian Reservation. The
United States sought to enjoin upstream non-Indian defendants
from diverting waters necessary for irrigating pasture and farmland
on the reservation. The governments theory was that there had
been an implied reservation in an 1888 cession agreement between
the tribes and the United States which retained for the Indians the
right to use all of the waters of the Milk River flowing through the
reservation. The non-Indian water users defended on the basis that
they had acquired water rights under state law by diverting and
applying water to beneficial use prior to any significant use of wa-
ter on the reservation. Accordingly, the defendants claimed that,
under the appropriation system and Montana law, they were prior
appropriators with the superior right. The Court rejected the de-
fendants' argument:
The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt
them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and
could not be .... That the Government did reserve them we have
decided, and for a use which would be necessarily continued
through the years. This was done May 1, 1888 [the date of the
creation of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation] .... 19
The decision in Winters has served as the keystone supporting
virtually all Indian water rights cases. 20 Since Winters, the reser-
vation doctrine has evolved into the following:
If the United States, by treaty, act of Congress or executive or-
der reserves a portion of the public domain for a federal purpose
which will ultimately require water, and if at the same time the
government intends to reserve unappropriated water for that pur-
18. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
19. Id. at 577 (citations omitted).
20. NATIONAL WATER COMVISSION, supra note 2, at 473.
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pose, then sufficient water to fulfill that purpose is reserved from
appropriation by private users. The effect of the doctrine is two-
fold: (1) when the water is eventually put to use the right of the
United States will be superior to private rights in the source of wa-
ter acquired after the date of the reservation, hence such private
rights may be impaired or destroyed without compensation by the
exercise of the reserved right, and (2) the federal use is not subject
to state laws regulating the appropriation and use of water.2 '
Unfortunately, such broad generalizations about- the scope of re-
served water rights do little to alleviate the impact of Indian water
rights upon the water rights of non-Indian water users in the West-
ern states. Because the doctrine was judicially created and-contin-
ues to be defined by the courts, many critical issues concerning the
nature and scope of these water rights remain undetermined.22
These unresolved issues support the states' position that state court
adjudication of Winters rights is both appropriate and absolutely
necessary.
III. THE ABORIGINAL RIGHT THEORY
One of the more recent and perhaps more controversial issues
surrounding the nature and extent of Winters water rights concerns
the origin of those rights. One school of thought advocates the posi-
tion that it was the Indians, not the federal government, who re-
served rights to the use of water on the reservation.23 The propo-
nents of this "aboriginal rights" theory rely primarily upon United
States v. Winans,24 in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the treaty establishing the Indian reservation for the Yakima
tribe involved a grant to the federal government of those rights
which the tribe had not reserved for itself, rather than a grant of
rights from the federal government to the tribe. The staunchest
advocate of this position, William Veeder, 25 relies upon the more re-
cent decision in United States v. Ahtanum Irri-gation District6 in
21. F. TRELEASE, supra note 2, at 109. See also Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
22. See Ranquist, The "Winters" Doctrine and How it Grew: Federal Res-
ervation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 639, 652
(citing 2 C. WHEATLEY, C. CORKER, T. STETSON, & D. REED, STUDY
OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND USE OF WATER RESOURCES
ON THE PUBLIc LANDS 556-63 (1969)).
23. Dellwo, supra note 2, at 215; Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount
Rights to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INS. 631,
645-49, (1971).
24. 198 U.S. 371 (1905). See also United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909,
911 (D. Idaho 1928).
25. Veeder, supra note 23.
26. 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957), on
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which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, citing Winans,
stated that even before the Yakima Tribe had signed its treaty with
the United States, "the Indians had the right to the use not only
of Ahtanum Creek but of all other streams in a vast area."27
The aboriginal rights theory is not supported by the weight of
case law and cannot be harmonized with rather clear judicial pro-
nouncements without some strained interpretations of case law.28
In Winters, for example, the Supreme Court not only acknowl-
edged the "power of the government to reserve waters," 2 9 but it also
held that the priority date of the water rights reserved for use on
the Fort Belknap Reservation was to be the same date as the estab-
lishment of that reservation.30 Establishment of the treaty date as
the date of priority indicates that the Court determined that the
implied water rights in Winters were granted to the tribes through
the 1888 treaty agreement with the United States.3 1 In Arizona v.
California,32 a modern Court restated the Winters holding:
The question of the Government's implied reservation of water
rights upon the creation of an Indian Reservation was before this
Court in Winters v. United States. . ., decided in 1908. Much the
same argument made to us was made in Winters to persuade the
Court to hold that Congress had created an Indian Reservation
without intending to reserve waters necessary to make the reserva-
tion livable. The Court rejected all of the arguments. As to
whether water was intended to be reserved, . . . [t]he Court in
Winters concluded that the Government, when it created that In-
dian Reservation, intended to deal fairly with the Indians by re-
serving for them the waters without which their lands would have
remand, 330 F.2d 897, rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (1964), cert. de-
nied, 381 U.S. 964 (1965).
27. Id. at 326.
28. See, e.g., Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights Versus State
Rights, 51 N.D. L. REV. 107, 124-25, .128-30 (1974); Veeder, supra note
23, at 644-47. Veeder attempts to explain away the meaning of the
Court's declaration in Winters that reserved rights were founded upon
the federal government's superior power to reserve water for its use.
Apparently, it is Veeder's contention that the Court, at that point, was
merely addressing the question of whether water rights reserved by
the Indians were later subject to divestiture upon the admission of
Montana into the union. However, there is nothing in Winters to
support such a narrow interpretation of the Court's language. Id. See
also notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
29. 207 U.S. at 577.
30. Id. at 564.
31. See Warner, Federal Reserved Water Rights and Their Relationship
to Appropriative Rights in the Western States, 15 ROCKY MTN. MIN-
ERAL L. INST. 399 (1970).
32. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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been useless. Winters has been followed by this Court as recently
as 1939 in United States v. Powers . . . We follow it now and
agree that the United States did reserve the water rights for the In-
dians effective as of the time the Indian reservations were created.3 3
In addition to the straightforward language in both Winters and
Arizona v. California, Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Colo-
rado River Water Conservation District v. United States3 4 (com-
monly known as Akin) stated that reserved rights were based upon
"an intention formed at the time the federal land use was estab-
lished to reserve a certain amount of water to support the federal
reservations." 35 That view is also firmly supported by Professor
Clark,36 who states that
the Winters case, as well as the other Indian cases, supports a num-
ber of propositions vital to the assertion of federal ownership of un-
appropriated, nonnavigable waters: . . . that, as the reliance on the
Rio Grande dictum shows, the power of the federal government to
make such reservations of water flows from the property clause
rather than the treaty power; that implication clearly is buttressed
by the Walker River case holding water to have been reserved al-
beit the reservation was created by proclamation.
3 7
Aside from these flaws, at least one commentator has raised the
possibility that the aboriginal rights theory will be detrimental to
the water rights claims on non-treaty reservations.38 In the face
of the weight of case law and scholarly work, Mr. Veeder clings to
the aboriginal theory by distinguishing "Arizona v. California In-
dian rights" from aboriginal rights-the former concept deriving
from the ownership by the national government of the unappropri-
ated rights to water on the public domain, the latter involving the
immemorial rights of Indians based upon aboriginal Indian owner-
ship of treaty lands.39
IV. THE SCOPE OF INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
Some treatises on Indian water rights have suggested that the
source of the reservation of Indian water rights is irrelevant be-
cause the priority dates antedate those of virtually all non-Indian
33. Id. at 599-600 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
34. 424U.S. 800 (1976).
35. Id. at 825.
36. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 102.4, at 59-61 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
37. Id. at 61. In United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334
(9th Cir. 1939), the court recognized the reservation of waters for
tribal use despite the fact that the reservation was created by
executive action.
38. Ranquist, supra note 22, at 654.
39. Veeder, supra note 23, at 656. Contra, Bloom, supra note 2, passim.
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appropriations.40 However, as Dean Trelease has observed, " [t] he
argument for paramount immemorial rights would, if accepted, per-
mit any use of the streams under Indian ownership."1 '
Despite these novel theories concerning the nature and extent
of Indian water rights, the courts have to date related the scope of
those rights to the purposes for which Indian reservations were es-
tablished. For example, in the latest decision of the United States
Supreme Court concerning federal reserved rights, Cappaert v.
United States,4 2 the Court stated:
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right
implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether
the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus avail-
able water. Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated wa-
ters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reser-
vation was created.43
Generally speaking, the intent to reserve waters is determined
by the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Indian reser-
vation, as well as the treaty agreements or other documents which
established the reservation. In Winters, for example, the Court
stated:
The case, as we view it, turns on the agreement of May, 1888,
resulting in the creation of Fort Belknap Reservation. In the con-
struction of this agreement there are certain elements to be consid-
ered that are prominent and significant. The reservation was a
part of a very much larger tract which the Indians had the right
to occupy and use and which was adequate for the habits and wants
of a nomadic and uncivilized people. It was the policy of the Gov-
ernment, it was the desire of the Indians, to change those habits and
to become a pastoral and civilized people. If they should become
such the original tract was too extensive, but a smaller tract would
be inadequate without a change of conditions. The lands were arid
and, without irrigation, were practically valueless. 44
40. See, e.g., Clyde, Special Considerations Involving Indian Rights, 8 NAT.
RzsouRcEs LAW. 237, 244 (1975).
41. F. TRELEASE, supra note 2, at 163. Presumably, Trelease's argument
rests upon a theory that if Indian water rights were aboriginal in
nature, they obviously would not be limited to the purposes for which
the reservation was established. See also Dellwo, supra note 2.
42. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
43. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
44. 207 U.S. at 575-76. In Moore v. United States, 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.
1946), the court took note of the fishing habits of the Quillayute In-
dians in determining the government's intent to reserve lands and
water sufficient to protect and expand that established industry of
the tribe. But see Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne, 86 Ore. 617, 638, 169 P. 121,
128 (1917). In Byers the court took a narrower view, concluding that
where the lands in question did not require water to produce crops
and where such irrigation as had taken place on the reservation had
been sporadic and had involved small acreage "[w]e cannot find in
the circumstances and conditions attending the negotiation of the In-
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Since the extent of Indian water rights is dependent upon the
purpose for which the reservation is established,45 one critical factor
is whether the right is limited to the original purposes for which
the reservation was established or should be expanded to account
for new uses on the reservation. This is one of the more trouble-
some questions concerning the Winters doctrine, the ultimate out-
come of which will have the greatest impact on the quantity of wa-
ter encompassed by Indian rights and their infringement upon
vested appropriations of non-Indians.
Proponents of the Indian position advocate that the Winters
rights should be expansive 'enough to take into account any future
needs and uses for water on the reservation. A fundamental prob-
lem with such an approach to Indian water rights is that it ignores
the basic justification for applying the doctrine-that the govern-
ment intended to reserve sufficient water rights to meet a contem-
plated purpose.46 Extending the doctrine to include uses not con-
templated when the reservation was established thus conflicts with
the rationale underlying the doctrine. Where the government has
evidenced an intention to reserve water for use on withdrawn land,
it is fair to attribute to the government the intention to provide wa-
ter for reasonably foreseeable uses to facilitate the purpose of the
reservation. However, it is not reasonable to conclude that suffi-
cient water is reserved for any use which might reasonably be
needed to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, regardless of the
fact that the use was not contemplated at the time of the creation
of the reservation. At least one court has used this rationale to
limit the proprietary water rights claims of the United States,47 and
dian treaty of 1855 any suggestion that the waters of the Umatilla
River were impliedly appropriated for the use of the Indians when-
ever they should see fit to avail themselves of these waters." Id.
The court went on to grant the Indians rights only to water required
for household use and for watering of livestock.
45. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 (1976).
46. The bulk of the decisions respecting Indian water rights have related
the reservation of water to agricultural purposes. E.g., Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527
(1939); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); United States
v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); Skeem v.
United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921); United States ex rel. Ray
v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928); Anderson v. Spear-Morgan
Livestock Co., 107 Mont. 18, 79 P.2d 667 (1938); Merrill v. Bishop,
69 Wyo. 45, 237 P.2d 186 (.1951).
47. Mimbres Valley Irr. Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977).
Mimbres was a general adjudication of water rights in which the
United States claimed minimum flows for recreational purposes within
the Gila National Forest. The court held that the recreation and
aesthetic uses of water within the national forest would not be given
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there seems to be no logical justification for not applying the same
rationale to Indian reserved water rights.
Another issue concerning the scope of Indian water rights is
whether the right is limited by the quantum of water used at the
time of the creation of the reservation or applied with reasonable
diligence to beneficial use. Indian advocates argue that the right
was meant to be open-ended to allow future development of the wa-
ter.48 That position was accepted in United States v. Ahtanum Irri-
gation District.49 In discussing the question of the amount of water
reserved by the Yakima Indians, the court noted that the reserva-
tion was not merely for present but for future use:
The implied reservation looked to the needs of the Indians in the
future when they would change their nomadic habits and become
accustomed to tilling the soil .... [T]his right extended to the ul-
timate needs of the Indians as those needs and requirements should
grow to keep pace with the development of Indian agriculture upon
the reservation. 50
Thus, in Ahtanum, the court ultimately decided that the quan-
tum of waters reserved was not measured by the use being made
at the time the treaty reservation was made. However, Ahtanum
was basically a contract case, turning on the validity of an agree-
ment for the distribution of waters made by the government on be-
half of the Indians with certain- non-Indian appropriators, and not
an adjudication of Indian water rights.
Equally inconclusive are the decisions in Winters and Conrad In-
vestment Co. v. United States.51 Although the conclusion has been
drawn that they point to an open-ended water right,52 in both cases
the court only required non-Indians to leave a specific amount of
water in the stream for the use of the Indian reservation in an
amount equal to that needed to meet the present uses of the Indians.
Admittedly, the Court did retain jurisdiction over the decree so that
if conditions on the reservation changed, the government could
come in and seek additional water.
priority dates equal to the date of creation of the reservation where
those uses were not within the primary purposes for which the forest
was established. See also WroTE; MAsTER REFEREE REPORT U.S. CLAIMS
WATER DivisioNs 4-6 (Colo. 1976) (similarly defining the United
States' proprietary claims).
48. See, e.g., Dellwo, supra note 2; Veeder, Winters Doctrine Rights-Key-
stone of National Programs for Western Land and Water Conservation
and Utilization, 26 MONT. L. REv. 149, 163 (1965).
49. 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956).
50. Id. at 327.
51. 156 F. 123, 132 (C.C.D. Mont. 1907), aff'd, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
52. See United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 326-27 (9th Cir.
1956).
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Another rather obvious problem with the open-ended approach
to Indian water rights is that while it puts subsequent non-federal
appropriators on notice that Indian water rights exist in a given
source of water, their appropriations are threatened by an expand-
ing water right which can continue to be exercised in ever-increas-
ing amounts. This does nothing to remove the cloud upon vested
non-Indian appropriations, nor does it provide the certainty neces-
sary to allow planning and development of water-related activities
by non-Indians.53
The special master and the Supreme Court recognized the defi-
ciencies of an open-ended decree in Arizona v. California."4 Spe-
cifically rejecting a proposal that he issue a decree "stating that
each Reservation may divert at any particular time all the water
reasonably necessary for its agricultural and related uses as against
those who appropriated water subsequent to its establishment," the
special master noted that such an open-ended decree "would place
all junior water rights in jeopardy of the uncertain and unknow-
able."55 Ultimately the United States Supreme Court decided that
the measure of the reserved Indian water right would be that
amount necessary to satisfy the present and future needs of the In-
dians based upon a quantum measured by practicably irrigable
acreage on the reservation.56
In Arizona v. California, the magnitude of the water rights cre-
ated was determined by agriculture since that was the purpose for
which the Indian reservations had been established.57 Under dif-
ferent conditions courts have reserved waters for purposes other
than, and in addition to, irrigation.5 8 At least two noted legal schol-
ars5 9 have presumed, however, that the decision in Arizona v. Cal-
ifornia, adopting a standard of practicably irrigable acreage, "has
53. Myers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 70 (1966).
54. 373 U.S.,546 (1963).
55. S. RIFKIND, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, ARIZONA v; CALIFORNIA
263-64 (1960) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER].
56. In addition to the open-ended and irrigable acreage tests, under the
holding in United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th
Cir. 1939), an additional test based upon present uses and needs has
evolved. See, e.g., Note, A Proposal for the Quantification of Reserved
Indian Water Rights, 74 CoLum. L. REV. 1299, 1313 (1974). In Walker
River, the Court noted that the size of the tribe had not dramatically
increased over a period of 70 years and the amount of water neces-
sary for future uses was found to be measured by the present uses on
the reservation. 104 F.2d at 340.
57. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 55, at 265.
58. See, e.g., Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (9th
Cir. 1918); Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1974).
59. Bloom, supra note 2, at 683; Moses, supra note 2, at 232.
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settled once and for all the previously open question of the proper
definition of the scope of such [Winters] rights."6 0
In view of the original intent of the federal government and the
Indians at the time of creation of most Indian reservations that the
Indians become a pastoral people, 61 this standard would appear to
be the most reasonable means of quantifying Indian water rights
in the majority of cases. Aside from the obvious benefit to holders
of non-Indian rights of providing a specific quantum of water
around which they could then plan, it is also a reasonable quantity
upon which to sustain the economic viability of Indian reserva-
tions. 6 2 From the Indian standpoint, it has a definite advantage of
not tying the quantum of water reserved to that which has already
been applied to some beneficial use which, in view of the slow eco-
nomic development of many Indian reservations, would produce a
rather low quantity of water.63
Assuming that the "irrigable acreage" test has in fact become the
accepted standard for measuring the nature and extent of an Indian
water right, the next problem becomes that of finding an adequate
definition of what is "irrigable." Edward Clyde points out some of
the problems in defining this term:
Land which would be susceptible of irrigation in 1888, when the
reservation was reduced in size by agreement under the Winters
case, is probably much less than the land within that same reser-
vation, which would be susceptible of irrigation with today's avail-
able sources of energy and with today's pumps and sprinkling sys-
tems. Also, the land which is susceptible of irrigation today might
be less than the amount which will be susceptible of irrigation at
some future date, if energy becomes cheaper or our technology in
pumping and sprinkling systems improves. Should the courts use
the acreage susceptible of irrigation when the reservation was cre-
ated, or at the time of the litigation, or speculate on the future?64
The decision in Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek,65
would appear to support a definition of irrigable acreage based upon
the susceptibility of the land to irrigation at the time the reserva-
tion was created since that expresses the totality of what could have
been contemplated at the time such waters were impliedly re-
served.66
60. Bloom, supra note 2, at 683.
61. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
62. See Clyde, supra note 40, at 249-50.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9tb
Cir. 1939).
64. Clyde, supra note 40, at 246.
65. 90 N.M. 410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977).
66. For a more detailed discussion of the issue of measuring irrigable acre-
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V. OTHER UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
With the arrival of the energy crisis and the concomitant pres-
sure for increased energy development in the West, it is not surpris-
ing that Indian water rights are frequently mentioned in connection
with potential energy development on the reservation. Such pur-
poses could not be used to define the measure of implied rights to
the extent that such purposes were not within the contemplation of
the federal government or the Indian tribes at the time of the crea-
tion of the Indian reservation.67
The greater question, however, is the extent to which changes
in the use or place of use of Indian water rights can be made. These
questions have not been definitively answered by the courts. One
commentator argues:
A reasonable approach would seem to be to determine the
amount of water required for the irrigable acreage, and then permit
the change of not only the place but also the type of use of that
water under the normal guidelines for such changes-lack of injury
to junior appropriators. This would permit the Indians to have the
quantity ofwater intended to be reserved for them at the time the
reservation was established, but give them the flexibility to use the
water at such locations and for such purposes as they might deter-
mine for themselves.6 8
This commentator also argues that, under United States v. Pow-
ers,69 the Supreme Court "held that white transferees of fee pat-
ented Indian allotments were equally with individual allottees
beneficially entitled to distribuqtion of the waters from the Indian
irrigation system. If Indians can alienate the land, and thereby ali-
enate the water, they should be able to dispose of the water
alone. ' 70 This analysis fails to take into account the fact that the
purpose of the Winters doctrine was basically to facilitate the pur-
poses of the reservation.71
age, see Sondheim & Alexander, Federal Indian Water Rights: A
Retrogression to Quasi-Riparanism?, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 26 (1960).
67. The special master found that other uses, such as industrial, which
may consume substantially more water than agricultural uses, were
not contemplated at the time the reservations in Arizona v. California
were created. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 55, at 265.
See generally Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
68. Moses, supra note 2, at 232.
69. 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
70. Moses, supra note 2, at 232.
71. Query whether, if the water were no longer necessary for the purpose
for which the land was reserved, that water should not then again
become a part of the stream system available for appropriation by
others? The result would be analogous to the concept of abandonment
under western water law, whereby water rights are lost to the stream
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This interpretation would also expand significantly the uses
which the doctrine authorizes, thus exacerbating the problems that
the doctrine creates. An alternative approach has been suggested
by Edward Clyde7 2 who states that
[f] irst,.. . the quantity of water and the sources from which it can
be taken ought to be fixed by court decree. Then, if the place and
nature of use are changed, the dominant position of the Indian wa-
ter right, because of its priority, ought not to be transferable off the
reservation. If the change to off-reservation uses will interfere
with prior vested rights, the change ought to be subordinate to such
rights.73
While this concept may appear reasonable in theory, its practicality
to the tribes is impaired by the fact that, for the most part, Indian
water rights have not been used and, therefore, no pattern of his-
toric use has evolved.
74
The special master in Arizona v. California did imply that
changes in use were within the ambit of the Winters doctrine, not-
ing that although the Indian water rights reserved for the five res-
ervations were based on irrigation uses, "[t] his does not necessarily
mean, however, that water reserved for Indian Reservations may not
be used for purposes other than agricultural and related uses. The
question of changing the character of use is not before me."75
VI. SOURCE OF SUPPLY
In applying the Winters doctrine, the courts have held that the
sources of reserved waters include waters arising upon, flowing
through, or bordering Indian reservations.76 Perhaps as a specter
of things to come, at least one commentator has raised a parade of
horribles relating to the source of supply of Indian water rights:
If there are several streams or other water sources available to the
Indian reservation, which collectively would exceed the Indians'
needs, which of the sources, or how much water from each source,
if beneficial use of the appropriation is discontinued. See, e.g., Note,
A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 226, 277 (1970) (citing
cases on abandonment).
72. Clyde, supra note 40, at 250.
73. Id.
74. Under normal guidelines, junior appropriators are entitled to mainte-
nance of stream conditions as they existed at the time of their ap-
propriations. See, e.g., Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v.
City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954). Applied to the
typical Indian water rights situation, in which significant water usage
has not yet occurred, this approach would severely restrict the profit-
ability of transferring those rights.
75. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 55, at 265.
76. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 598.
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was impliedly reserved? May the Indians take all of the water
from the streams where the cost of constructing facilities to divert
the water is more favorable to them, even though by so doing they
foreclose all non-Indian use of the waters of those particular
streams? May they take the primary or firm flow of many streams
and require the non-Indian users to expend money for storage of
the high flow? If a particular stream, with reasonable expenditure,
will yield to them all the water they need except in cases of ex-
treme drought, are they entitled during periods of drought to go to
streams which are not normally necessary to meet their needs? 7
This is not to say, of course, that all waters -arising upon an In-
dian reservation automatically make them subject to the Winters
doctrine. In United States v. Wightman 8 the rights of prior appro-
priators were held to be superior to Indian claims to several springs
which flowed through the reservation. The springs arose upon
lands which had been transferred from military use to the reserva-
tion. The court reasoned that the particular waters were not "nec-
essary to the objects for which the reservation was created,"7 9 and
that the Indians' needs could be satisfied out of other sources. Fi-
nally, the court noted that Winters "is not an authority that the
mere creation [of the reservation] reserves to the Indians, or to the
United States for their benefit, the beneficial use of all waters flow-
ing within the reservation." 80
In contrast to the limitations on supply suggested by Wightman,
at least one group of Indians has laid claim to
all waters, including those on the surface and underground, occur-
ring on, arising upon, passing through, or bordering upon the Wind
River Indian Reservation, Wyoming; all water that may now or in
the future be artificially augmented or created by weather modifi-
cation, by desalination or presently unusable water supplies, by
production of water supplies as a byproduct of geothermal power
development, or by any other scientific or other type of means
within the Wind River Reservation, Wyoming.8 1
In response to such broad claims to water and in order to allevi-
ate the uncertainty surrounding the impact of Winters rights, the
adjudication of those rights8 2 should include an accounting for the
77. Clyde, Indian Water Rights, in 2 WATERS AND WATm RIcGHTS, 373, 392
(R. Clark ed. 1967).
78. 230 F. 277 (D. Ariz. 1916).
79. Id. at 282.
80. Id. at 283.
81. Joint Resolution, Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, Fort Washakie, Wy-
oming, Resolution No. 3360 (Dec. 27, 1973). See also Veeder, supra
note 23, at 658.
82. See § VII of text infra (discussing the adjudication of Indian water
rights).
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amount of water to be drawn from each potential source of sup-
ply.8 3
Another question of major concern to the states is the effect of
the reserved rights doctrine upon interstate streams. In the West,
most interstate streams have been apportioned under the doctrine
of equitable apportionment 4 or the waters have been allocated un-
der an interstate compact.8 5 In either event, once the waters of the
interstate stream have been apportioned among two or more states,
the issue of allocating sufficient water to supply reservation water
rights surfaces.
In Arizona v. California, the claims of the United States made
on behalf of the Indians were satisfied out of the share allocated
to each state within which the reservation was located.8 6 Where
the waters are subject to an interstate compact, Indian water rights
are often exempted from the purview of the compact,87 leaving un-
settled the portion of water to be taken from each state in order
to supply Indian water rights. In United States v. Nevada,s8 the
United States Supreme Court intimated that to the extent neces-
sary, the reserved right may be satisfied out of the allocations of
both states.8 9 In the absence of agreement among the states as to
the quantities to be deducted from their respective allocations, the
unfortunate but likely result would be that an apportionment
would be made in the first instance by the United States Supreme
Court.90
VII. THE NECESSITY FOR STATE ADJUDICATION
OF INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
Despite the uncertainties that exist with respect to the nature
and extent of Indian water rights it is reasonably certain that when
they are finally adjudicated, the quantity reserved will be large and
will constitute a "threat" to existing uses of water and create seri-
ous uncertainty which will affect the development of even unappro-
priated streams.9 1 The uncertainty surrounding Winters rights re-
83. See Note, supra note 56, at 1319.
84. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46 (1907).
85. See, e.g., Yellowstone River Compact, Wyo. STAT. § 41-511 (1957).
86. 373 U.S. at 601.
87. E.g., Colorado River Compact, Wyo. STAT. § 41-505, art. VII (1957);
Yellowstone River Compact, Wyo. STAT. § 41-511, art. VI (1957).
88. 412 U.S. 534 (1973).
89. Id. at 539.
90. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
91. F. TRELEASE, supra note 2, at 166-67.
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sults in part because of the unanswered questions concerning the
scope of the right and in part because the doctrine represents only
legal claims to water rather than established uses on most Indian
reservations. The full quantity of water required to satisfy the
rights and the timing of the exercise of those rights remains un-
known and poses an ever-present threat to non-Indian appropria-
tions."
The economies of the semi-arid West thrive or perish based upon
the availability of water. While the West was developing, there was
no intimation that the water supplies upon which these economies
have become dependent were in jeopardy because of the Winters
doctrine. On the contrary, during the fifty years which elapsed be-
tween Winters and Arizona v. California "the United States was
pursuing a policy of encouraging the settlement of the West and the
creation of family-sized farms on its arid lands."93  For these rea-
sons, Arizona v. California and its progeny of bold and broad claims
to reserved water rights9 4 have had a tremendous impact on the
Western United States. As one study has noted,
[t]he result has been apprehension in the western public land
states that the doctrine will have the effect of disrupting estab-
lished water right priority systems and destroying, without com-
pensation, water rights considered to have vested under state law.
Moreover, the uncertainty generated by the doctrine is an impedi-
ment to sound coordinated planning for future water resources de-
velopment.95
From the states' standpoint, there is an imperative need to inven-
tory Indian water requirements and to adjudicate and quantify In-
dian rights so that their relationship to non-Indian rights can be
established. Without a reasonable quantification, Indian water
rights claims may become so expanded by conceptualistic thinking
that a situation of chaos will be created in the appropriation system.
Compounding the controversy over federal reserved rights is the
difficulty encountered by state water authorities in coordinating In-
dian water rights claims with state water law administration and the
uncertainty surrounding the ability of the states to bring a lawsuit
against the federal government for the purpose of adjudicating
these claims. Each of the Western states has a system for the ad-
ministration of the use of water within its boundaries.9 6 Those de-
92. Clyde, supra note 40, at 245; Myers, supra note 53, at 70-71.
93. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 474.
94. Pelcyger, Indian Water Rights: Some Emerging Frontiers, 21 RocKY
MTN. MINERAL L. INsT. 743 (1975); Veeder, supra note 28, at 107.
95. PuBLic LAND LAw REVIEw COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
LANDs 144 (1970).
96. A SUMMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS, supra note 15, at 11-26.
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siring to use water apply to the state through the system and the
state then apportions the available waters among the applicants in
some equitable manner. Indian water rights, on the other hand, are
created outside of the system of state law and exist independently
of that systemY7 This poses a major hurdle for those water users
who wish to alleviate some of the uncertainty by obtaining the
quantification of Indian water rights.
Since, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, neither the fed-
eral government nor the tribes can be sued without their consent,
any attempt to obtain an adjudication of reserved rights prior to
1952 was futile.98 In 1952, Congress removed one of the bars to liti-
gation through the passage of a general waiver of sovereign immu-
nity in the area of water rights, commonly known as the McCarran
Amendment.9" The McCarran Amendment provided:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any
suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights,
where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the
process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law,
by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a
necessary party to such suit.100
Soon after its passage, certain court decisions limited the scope
of the amendment. In Miller v. Jennings'01 five plaintiffs and their
water district, claiming to represent a class of about ninety, sued
the federal government, local government officials, another water
district, and eleven individual defendants who were alleged to rep-
resent more than one thousand others similarly situated. An order
of dismissal was affirmed on the grounds that the waiver in the Mc-
Carran Amendment covered only a proceeding in which all persons
who have rights are before the tribunal.10 2 Similarly, in Dugan v.
Rank,10 3 the Court held that the "suit" requirements of the McCar-
ran Amendment were not met by a private suit to determine the
rights of some, but not all of the water users along a river as against
97. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 473.
98. Anderson v. Spear-Morgan Livestock Co., 107 Mont. 18, 79 P.2d 667
(1938).
99. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). This statute was enacted in 1952 as a rider
to the appropriations act for the Justice Department. Department of
Justice Appropriations Act of 1953, ch. 651, § 208(a) to (c), 66 Stat.
549, 560.
100. 43 U.S.C.'§ 666 (1970).
101. 243 F.2d 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 827 (1957).
102. Id. at 159.
103. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
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the United States. 04 Finally, in Rank v. (Krug) United States,1° 5
the waiver of sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment
was restricted to exclude proceedings which are exclusively admin-
istrative in nature.
These early cases appeared to limit the utility of the McCarran
Amendment to the states. However, during the 1970's a series of
decisions by the United States Supreme Court have more clearly
defined the scope of the McCarran Amendment, thus paving the
way for state court adjudications of Indian water rights. In United
States v. District Court for Eagle County,:0 the Supreme Court held
that the holding of Dugan v. Rank was not to be applied in an
overly technical manner. The federal government, resisting joinder
in a Colorado adjudication, argued that the proceeding was not a
general adjudication under Dugan v. Rank since those claimants
whose rights had been decreed in prior adjudications were not be-
fore the court. The Court rejected the position of the government
as "extremely technical." 0 7 The Court agreed that the absence of
some claimants under prior decrees could present some problems if
a conflict developed between their rights and the federal rights in-
volved, but held that this factor was insufficient to obviate the ne-
cessity of federal presence as a party to a supplemental adjudica-
tion. 0 8 Additionally, the Court ruled that reserved rights of the
United States are included in the phrase "where . . . the United
States is the owner of . . .water rights by appropriation under
State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise," 0 9 and the Court
intimated that the reserved rights of Indians were also within the
purview of the Act." 0
In a companion case to Eagle County, United States v. District
Court ex rel. Water Division No. 5,"' the Court granted approval
to joinder of the United States under the new Colorado water ad-
judication act" 2 through which water rights were adjudicated on
a month-by-month basis. Thus, the term "general adjudication"
104. These cases appear to accord with the legislative history of the statute
which indicates that the waiver was designed to allow participation
of the United States in general adjudications in which all of the rights
of various owners on a given stream are to be determined. S. REP.
No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1951).
105. 142 F. Supp. 1, 74 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
106. 401 U.S. 520 (,1971).
107. Id. at 525.
108. Id. at 525-26.
109. Id. at 523.
110. Id.
111. 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
112. COLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to 602 (1973).
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was more loosely construed in these cases than had previously been
the case in the prior decisions.
In the final analysis, however, it was Akin 113 in which the appli-
cability of the McCarran Amendment to Indian water rights was
ultimately determined. Akin arose when the United States filed a
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
naming over one thousand defendants (water users on the streams
involved) and seeking an adjudication of the federal reserved water
rights held by Indian tribes and by the United States in its proprie-
tary capacity. Several defendants then filed for an adjudication
within the state water system and sought dismissal of the federal
suit.
The United States Supreme Court dismissed the federal action,
citing several factors which weighed in favor of state proceed-
ings.11 4 While the Court rejected the Colorado claimants' allegation
that the McCarran Amendment made the state court the sole forum
for water adjudications, the Court did say that the amendment gave
state courts jurisdiction to determine Indian water rights. The
Court noted "[n] ot only the Amendment's language, but also its un-
derlying policy, dictates a construction including Indian rights in its
provisions."' 15 Citing from the Senate report on the McCarran
Amendment, the Court observed further that:
"In the administration of and the adjudication of water rights un-
der State laws the State courts are vested with the jurisdiction nec-
essary for the proper and efficient disposition thereof, and by rea-
son of the interlocking of adjudicated rights on any stream system,
any order or action affecting one right affects all such rights. Ac-
cordingly all water users on a stream, in practically every case, are
interested and necessary parties to any court proceedings. It is ap-
parent that if any water user claiming to hold such right by reason
of the ownership thereof by the United States or any of its depart-
ments is permitted to claim immunity from suit in, or orders of, a
State court, such claims could materially interfere with the lawful
and equitable use of water for beneficial use by the other water
users who are amenable to and bound by the decrees and orders of
the State courts." Thus, bearing in mind the ubiquitous nature of
Indian water rights in the Southwest, it is clear that a construction
113. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976) (Akin).
114. In Akin the Court noted that the policy behind the McCarran Amend-
ment favored unified adjudications which were more available in state
court, that only the complaint had been filed in the federal proceeding,
that there were extensive state water rights involved in the litigation,
that there was a great distance between the federal and state courts,
and that the United States had previously participated in other state
adjudications. Id. at 819-20.
115. Id. at 810.
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of the Amendment excluding those rights from its coverage would
enervate the Amendment's objective. 116
Armed with Akin, the states firmly believed that they had suc-
ceeded in their attempts to obtain the meaningful quantification of
Indian reserved water rights within their long established state wa-
ter resource systems. Akin seemed to end all doubts as to the intent
of the McCarran Amendment to include all reserved rights within
its purview so that the uncertainties, insecurities, and apprehen-
sions surrounding the legal claims of reserved water rights could
once and for all be settled. Unfortunately, that is not the case. Tri-
bal attorneys, and in some instances Justice Department attorneys,
at the behest of the Indians, are mounting a new attack by which
they seek to obstruct state quantifications.
The first prong of attack is based upon disclaimer provisions
found in at least nine Western state constitutions.'1 1 The Wyoming
Constitution typifies this disclaimer language and provides:
The people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they for-
ever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands
lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying within
said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that
until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United
States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of
the United States and that said Indian lands shall remain under the
absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United
States ... 118
In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan," 9 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the effect of similar disclaimer language. Kake in-
volved a dispute over Alaska's jurisdiction over the Thlinget In-
dians, who were claiming the right to trap salmon without state reg-
ulation. Reviewing the provisions of the disclaimer clause, the
Court found that "'absolute' federal jurisdiction is not invariably
exclusive jurisdiction,' ' 20 and that the sole purpose of the dis-
claimer clause was to renounce any proprietary ownership by the
state of reservation lands and to give recognition of the jurisdiction
of the United States over said lands.12' Finally, the Court held
"that the words 'absolute jurisdiction and control' are not intended
to oust the State completely from regulation of Indian 'property
116. Id. at 810-11 (quoting S. REP. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 4-5 (1951)).
117. Arizona, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
118. WyO. CoNsT. art. 21, § 26.
119. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
120. Id. at 68.
121. Id. at 60.
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(including fishing rights).' "122 Under the holding in Kake, the
states would lack jurisdiction over the tribes only to the extent that
they were seeking to exercise a proprietary rather than a govern-
mental interest over the rights of Indian tribes.
However, in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,123
the Court narrowed the breadth of the Kake decision stating that
the Kake "holding came in the context of a decision concerning the
fishing rights of non-reservation Indians .... It did not purport
to provide guidelines for the exercise of state authority in areas set
aside by treaty for the exclusive use and control of Indians." 1'2 4 The
implication of McClanahan is that while disclaimer provisions may
not preclude state jurisdiction, other factors must be analyzed to
assess the validity of state jurisdiction over Indian tribes.
Using the factors enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in McClanahan, at least two bases for the exercise of state
jurisdiction over Indian water rights exist: (1) where Congress
has expressly delegated to the state or recognized in the state some
power of government with respect to Indians; or (2) where a ques-
tion involving Indians involves non-Indians to a degree which calls
into play the jurisdiction of the state government, and where that
state regulation does not infringe upon tribal self-government. 125
The McCarran Amendment is a clear expression of congressional in-
tent to grant state jurisdiction over the adjudication of Indian water
rights. 26 Moreover, the policy behind the McCarran Amendment
and the very nature of Indian water rights claims and their inter-
relationship with non-Indian claims to water fully satisfies the sec-
ond set of criteria. The water flowing through the reservation
certainly provides the same source of water to satisfy non-Indian as
well as Indian appropriations and, until those Indian water -rights
are determined, an adjudication of non-Indian rights would be mean-
ingless. It is clear that the states have a sovereign interest in the
regulation of the use of waters within their borders and, because of
the interrelationship of Indian water rights claims with non-Indian
water rights claims, 27 they also have the right to assert that juris-
diction over Indian water rights claims.
122. Id. at 71.
123. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
124. Id. at 176, n.15 (citations omitted).
125. See also F. CoHEN, FELIx S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 117 (1942).
126. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1976) (Akin). Accord, State ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis,
88 N.M. 636, 545 P.2d 1014 (1976).
127. Akin, 424 U.S. at 810-11.
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The second prong of the tribal attack on state jurisdiction relies
upon the enactment of statutes such as Public Law 280128 which, in
the view of Indian advocates, supersede the granting of jurisdiction
to the states under the McCarran Amendment.12 9 That law pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that nothing contained in the Act, which
provides a mechanism for the assertion of state jurisdiction on In-
dian reservations, "shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to ad-
judicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right
to possession of [any real or personal property, including water
rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe. .. that is held
in trust by the United States] . *..."130 Tribal reliance upon that
law appears to be ill-founded, however. As a statute granting gen-
eral jurisdiction to the states, Public Law 280 did not supersede spe-
cific congressional grants of authority to the states over Indian
affairs and, therefore, it is not a limitation on the special consent to
state jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights.' 31
The policy of the McCarran Amendment clearly recognized the
necessity for adjudicating federal reserved rights claims, both In-
dian and non-Indian, in a state forum. Many of the problems cre-
ated by reserved rights are encountered in coordinating the poten-
tially vast but unquantified federal claims within state planning
and administration. Federal policies abrogating compliance with
state water laws and claiming paramount federal rights under the
authority of the reserved rights doctrine impair this planning and
development at the state level. As the Court pointed out in Akin
in dismissing a federal action in favor of a state general adjudica-
tion,
[i]ndeed, we have recognized that actions seeking the allocation of
water essentially involve the disposition of property and are best
conducted in unified proceedings.... The consent to jurisdiction
given by the McCarran Amendment bespeaks a policy that recog-
nizes the availability of comprehensive state systems for adjudica-
tion of water rights as the means for achieving these goals....
128. Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, § 4, 67 Stat. 588, 589 (1953) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (1970)); accord, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, §§ 401-402,
82 Stat. 73, 79 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1323 (1970)).
129. See, e.g., Ranquist, supra note 22, at 702-06; Veeder, supra note 28,
at 114.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970); 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1970) (same lan-
guage). See note 128 supra.
131. Akin, 424 U.S. at 811-12 n.20. In State ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis, 88
N.M. 636, 545 P.2d 1014 (1976), the New Mexico Supreme Court was
called upon to decide whether the disclaimer language found in the
New Mexico Constitution would prohibit the State of New Mexico from
adjudicating Indian water rights in the state court pursuant to the
McCarran Amendment. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that
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Additionally, the responsibility of managing the State's waters, to
the end that they be allocated in accordance with adjudicated water
rights, is given to the State Engineer. 132
It is the states' position that Akin is not only determinative of
the issue of state jurisdiction over the adjudication of Indian water
rights claims, but should set the tone for the federal government
and its beneficiaries, the Indian tribes, to remove the uncertainty
and insecurity created by Indian water rights claims, and to cooper-
ate with state court adjudications. Participation by the tribes inde-
pendently or through the federal government 3 3 within the state
water adjudication systems is the most straightforward legal proce-
dure available for the resolution of Indian water rights claims and
would settle conclusively many of the uncertainties discussed above.
Once the scope of the Indian rights is adequately defined and inte-
grated into the states' water systems, those rights will be protected
by the states, and this will facilitate the orderly planning and devel-
opment of water resources by Indians and non-Indians alike. 3 4
Non-Indian water users have endured the uncertainty caused by the
amorphous nature of Indian water right claims long enough. The
disruption which these claims generate in their unquantified form
mandates their prompt adjudication within state water rights sys-
tems.
the disclaimer provision was irrelevant because (1) the state was not
asserting a proprietary interest in Indian lands, and (2) the states
could exercise power over the Indians if the federal government had
specifically granted that authority. In answering the claims of the
United States that Public Law 280 superseded the McCarran Amend-
ment, the court noted
Public Law 280 is irrelevant to the present controversy for
two reasons. First, New Mexico was not granted, nor has
it assumed general civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian
reservations located within the state. Second, Public Law280 did not repeal or affect in any way the McCarran Amend-
ment, which granted to all states jurisdiction to adjudicatefederally reserved water rights, including those reserved for
Indians.
88 N.M. at 638, 545 P.2d at 10,16 (court referred to 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-
1323 (1970) as Public Law 280, see note 128 supra). It is interesting
to note that Reynolds was decided just one month prior to the United
States Supreme Court decision granting state jurisdiction in Akin
upon grounds similar to those relied upon by the New Mexico Supreme
Court in Reynolds.
132. 424 U.S. at 819-20 (citations omitted).
133. The tribes have, on occasion, successfully argued that the federal
government cannot adequately represent them due to an impermissible
conflict of interest between the proprietary claims of the government
and those of the tribes. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th
Cir. 1976). But see United States v. Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist., No.
R-1987-JBA (D. Nev. Dec. 8, 1977).
134. Bloom, supra note 2, at 693,
